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The Power of the Attorney General to Supercede a
District Attorney: Substance, Procedure & Ethics
Charles J. Yeager*
Lee Hargrave**
The Louisiana attorney general, using powers granted in the Louis-
iana Constitution of 1974, has successfully obtained judicial authorization
to supercede a district attorney in two instances. This article focuses on
judicial construction of the substantive grounds or "cause" to supercede
and on the procedural innovations developed to implement the sub-
stantive power. Both the Perez' and Bush 2 cases involved politically
sensitive, well-publicized matters of important public interest. Both dealt
with the alleged personal misconduct and the ethics of high-profile district
attorneys, rather than illuminating the conceptual conflict between state
and local governmental power that underlies the basic constitutional
provision.
BACKGROUND
Under the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, the attorney general was
an officer of the judicial branch of government.3 He was invested with
statewide criminal jurisdiction to initiate original criminal prosecutions
or to intervene in existing ones.4 Implicit in this power was the inde-
pendent prosecutorial discretion as to when and how to exercise it., The
Constitution of 1921, however, did not solve the constitutional conflict
that would arise when both the district attorney and attorney general
exercised their prosecutorial authority simultaneously, but contradictorily,
Copyright 1991, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
A.B. Trinity College; M.T.S., Harvard University; J.D., LSU; Assistant Attorney
General who served as trial counsel in the supercession proceedings against East Baton
Rouge Parish District Attorney Bryan Bush.
** Wex S. Malone Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. In re Superseding the District Attorney of the 25th Jud. Dist., 454 So. 2d 806
(La. 1981).
2. In re Superseding the District Attorney of the 19th Jud. Dist., 538 So. 2d 606
(La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 541 So. 2d 903 (1989).
3. La. Const. art. VII, § 56 (1921) specified the powers of the attorney general in
the article titled "Judiciary Department." Section 1 of article V ("Executive Department")
did not include the attorney general in its listing of the officials in the executive department.
4. Kemp v. Stanley, 204 La. 110, 120, 15 So. 2d 1, 4 (1943); State v. Ardoin, 197
La. 877, 886, 2 So. 2d 633, 636 (1941).
5. Id.
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in one case. It did not expressly grant the attorney general the power
to replace or supercede the district attorney in such circumstances; it
only vested him with the ambiguous authority to "exercise supervision"
over the district attorneys.6
A statute sought to solve the dispute by giving the attorney general
power to supercede the district attorney in those cases in which the
attorney general exercised his criminal powers. 7 The Louisiana Supreme
Court declared the statute authorizing supercession to be unconstitutional
because it infringed upon the district attorney's constitutional authority.
A close reading of the court's decision in Kemp v. StanleyA reveals that
the constitutional objection was to the statute's authorization for the
attorney general to exercise the power of supercession unilaterally, with
or without cause, and without judicial review of possible abuse of
discretion. Kemp v. Stanley did suggest the attorney general had authority
to supercede for cause, subject to judicial review.9
The Constitution of 1974 sought to resolve the issue of local versus
state authority in article IV, section 8, which grants to the attorney
general express power to supercede. When authorized by a court, the
attorney general exercises the powers of the district attorney to act as
the legal representative of the state in a particular criminal or civil action
or proceeding. The grant of the power to supercede was accompanied
by the deletion of the former power to institute prosecutions and to
intervene in criminal cases. The power to institute criminal proceedings
is now exclusively that of the district attorneys, subject only to su-
percession by the attorney general, which can be done only with court
authorization. 0 The Constitution of 1974 resolved the jurisdictional con-
flict between state and local authority by weighing the scales heavily in
favor of the local authority, subject to the check and balance of the
attorney general's power to supercede for cause.
Article IV, section 8 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides:
There shall be a Department of Justice, headed by the attorney
general, who shall be the chief legal officer of the state....
6. La. Const. art. VII, § 56 (1921).
7. 1934 La. Acts (1st Extraordinary Session) No. 24 (amending La. Code Crim. P.
arts. 17, 156).
8. 204 La. 110, 15 So. 2d 1 (1943).
9. Id. at 14-16; Hargrave, The Judiciary Article of the Louisiana Constitution of
1974, 37 La. L. Rev. 765, 835 n.308 (1977).
10. Powers. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, a district
attorney, or his designated assistant, shall have charge of every criminal
prosecution by the state in his district, be the representative of the state
before the grand jury in his district, and be the legal advisor to the
grand jury. He shall perform other duties provided by law.
La. Const. Art. V, § 26(B) (emphasis added); See also La. R.S. 16:1(B), (C) (1982) and
La. Code Crim. P. art. 64.
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As necessary for the assertion or protection of any right or
interest of the state, the attorney general shall have authority
(1) to institute, prosecute, or intervene in any civil action or
proceeding; (2) upon the written request of a district attorney,
to advise and assist in the prosecution of any criminal case;
and (3) for cause, when authorized by the court which would
have original jurisdiction and subject to judicial review, (a) to
institute, prosecute or intervene in any criminal action or pro-
ceeding, or (b) to supersede any attorney representing the state
in any civil or criminal action.
The attorney general shall exercise other powers and perform
other duties authorized by this constitution or by law.
The attorney general has judicially asserted his powers under article
IV, section 8(3) in only two cases. In 1981, he sought judicial author-
ization to supercede the district attorney of Plaquemines Parish, Leander
Perez, Jr." ("Perez"). In 1989, he twice sought judicial authorization
to supercede Bryan Bush, the district attorney of East Baton Rouge
Parish 2 ("Bush" and "Bush I"). These two cases have produced sig-
nificant definition of the key concepts of the criminal enforcement powers
vested in the attorney general by that provision of the constitution.
Perez provides the more significant substantive interpretation of the
law. However, because the procedure for supercession is vague in the
constitutional provision, Bush is significant for its procedural innovation
which facilitated a final judgment of supercession in a matter of five
months, rather than the years required in Perez.
FACTUAL CONTEXT
The supercession petition in Perez alleged as "cause" that the district
attorney had engaged in misconduct-obstructing the activities of the
grand jury for which he was the legal advisor. The matter involved was
the grand jury's investigation and indictment of the district attorney
and Delta Development Corporation, a family enterprise, for theft from
the parish. An exception of no cause of action to the supercession
11. In re the Matter of Attorney General William J. Guste, Jr. Superseding the
District Attorney of the Twenty-Fifth Judicial District, 454 So. 2d 806 (La. 1981); See
also, State v. Perez, 464 So. 2d 737 (La. 1985); Superseding of District Attorney of
Twenty-Fifth Judicial District, 411 So. 2d 469 (La. 1982).
12. In re: the Matter of Attorney General William J. Guste, Jr. Superceding the
District Attorney of the Nineteenth Judicial District, No. 12-88-103 on the docket of the
Nineteenth Judicial District Court; writ denied, No. KW 89 0088 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989);
writ denied, No. KW 89 0271 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989); writ granted, 538 So. 2d 606
(La. 1989); writ denied, No. KW 89 0271 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989): writ denied, 541 So.
2d 903 (La. 1989).
1991]
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petition was granted by the trial court, but reversed by the Louisiana
Supreme Court, which ruled that the attorney general's allegations of
obstruction of the grand jury stated constitutional cause for superces-
sion. 3
Bush was precipitated by newspaper accounts of mishandled or
missing funds used to pay informants-funds in the personal custody
of the district attorney. The district court granted authorization to the
attorney general to supercede Bush and to act as district attorney ad
hoc. 4
The Perez supercession was effected through what was termed a
civil rule to show cause. 5 Bush was presented through a contradictory
motion to supercede and to recuse under Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure article 680(1). 16 It was argued that since Bush involved criminal
procedure, a high burden of proof was needed to support a showing
of cause to supercede. The court did not require proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt and adopted the burden of proof required in recusal
proceedings-a preponderance of the evidence. It should follow that the
burden of proof in supercession proceedings will be the same regardless
of whether the matter is brought before the court for judicial author-
ization by civil or criminal procedure.
The court found that the evidence preponderated in favor of the
attorney general as to five of the six allegations of cause to supercede.
It granted supercession and recusal, empowered the attorney general to
act as a district attorney ad hoc under Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure article 682 in relation to the subject matter of the cause
alleged, and authorized the empaneling of a special grand jury to hear
the case.
The court denied an appeal, ruling that, since the supercession had
been brought pursuant to the recusal procedure of the Louisiana Code
of Criminal Procedure, article 684 required Bush to seek judicial review
by an application for supervisory writs. Writs were denied by the court
of appeal17 and the supreme court. s
While judicial review by the higher courts was pending, Bush sought
an indictment against the two assistant attorneys general handling the
13. 454 So. 2d at 807.
14. District Judge Robert Hester's ruling is reprinted in its entirety in the appendix,
pp. 751 to 754, infra.
15. Docket No. 62-463, Twenty-Fifth District Court, in and for' the Parish of Pla-
quemine, State of Louisiana.
16. "A district attorney shall be recused when he: (1) has a personal interest in the
cause or grand jury proceeding which is in conflict with the fair and impartial admin-
istration of justice."
17. No. KW 89 0271 (April 10, 1989) (La. App. 1st Cir.).
18. 541 So. 2d 903 (La. 1989).
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supercession proceeding. In response, the attorney general filed a second
supercession and recusal motion ("Bush IP') seeking to intervene in that
grand jury proceeding, to recuse Bush as its legal adviser, and to prohibit
institution of prosecution against officers of the Justice Department. 19
The "cause" for Bush II was the alleged violation of due process
of law by Bush's abuse of the powers of his office to advance his
personal interest in the avoidance of prosecution, conviction and pun-
ishment, and the political motivation not to lose political office. De-
finitive court action in Bush II was mooted by the district attorney's
conviction pursuant to a plea bargain. 20 Nevertheless, the supreme court
gave some credence to the theory advanced in the second petition by
issuing stay orders halting both the grand jury proceeding and the
institution of prosecution. Bush II is also significant in that it was the
first assertion by the attorney general that under his powers in article
IV, section 8, abuse of prosecutorial power by a district attorney which
rises to the level of a substantive due process violation is "cause" for
supercession.
SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS FOR SUPERCESSION
The fundamental substantive issue in these proceedings has been the
nature of the "cause" required by Louisiana Constitution Article IV,
section 8(3) to authorize the attorney general to supercede. The consti-
tution itself does not define cause directly. An early explanation of the
requirement was derived from the debates on the proposal during the
constitutional convention:
The cause requirement is related to the introductory phrase of
the paragraph, "[ais necessary for the assertion or protection
of any right or interest of the state," indicating that the "cause"
must be associated with the fact that a right or interest of the
state is not being satisfactorily represented or asserted by a
district attorney.21
This interpretation appeared to be approved by the Louisiana Supreme
Court before the attorney general initiated the first supercession pro-
ceeding. In Plaquemine Parish Commission Council v. Perez,2 the coun-
19. In Re: Grand Jury Investigations, No. 3-89-569 on the docket of the Nineteenth
Judicial District Court.
20. Bush plead guilty in a plea bargain to one misdemeanor violation of La. R.S.
44:34, :37 (1982).
21. Hargrave, supra note 9, at 835.
22. 379 So. 2d 1373 (La. 1980). To the extent the case held that a district attorney
could not be recused until an indictment or a bill of information was returned, it was
overruled by the amendment to La. Code Crim. P. art. 680 by 1980 La. Acts, No. 195.
The amendment added that recusation can be had if the prosecutor has a personal interest
in a "grand jury proceeding" or is related to a person "who is a focus of a grand jury
investigation."
1991)
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cil instituted an injunctive and recusal action because of an allegedly
bad faith investigation by District Attorney Perez. The Louisiana Su-
preme Court noted in dictum that even if recusal or an injunction was
not legally justified, the district attorney could still be superceded by
the attorney general for cause. The supreme court, referring to article
IV, section 8(3), stated that "[tihe 'cause' requirement refers to a showing
that the district attorney is not adequately asserting some right or interest
of the state."23
The following year, the attorney general superceded Perez based
upon his alleged obstruction of the grand jury which indicted him and
a family corporation in which he had a financial interest. The Louisiana
Supreme Court found that the conduct alleged-obstructing the grand
jury's attempt to indict him and others by causing the grand jury to
be prematurely discharged, and by filing criminal charges against mem-
bers of the grand jury-was cause for judicial authorization for su-
percession. The attorney general could then assert and protect "the
state's rights and interests in the matters under investigation by the
additional grand jury or which have arisen therefrom.'"' The "cause"
in Perez was not so much the abstract power of a district attorney to
dismiss a grand jury or to file charges against persons who are members
of a grand jury. Rather, it was important that these acts were done to
thwart a grand jury inquiry into his own personal interests. The state's
right and interest in the fair enforcement of its laws and in the integrity
of the grand jury allegedly were being thwarted.
Perez demonstrates that the conduct constituting "cause" for su-
percession need not in fact be criminal. After Perez's prosecution for
malfeasance and conviction on three counts, the supreme court held two
of the three counts, including the institution of prosecution against grand
jury members in retaliation, not to be crimes. 25 The jury had acquitted
Perez on one count of the indictment. The implication is that a failure
to assert or protect rights of interests of the state may arise within legal
contexts other than objective criminal acts or omissions and be just as
constitutionally efficacious as the predicate "cause" for judicial au-
thorization for supercession.
Another clear inference is that allegations of criminal misconduct
by the district attorney within his own jurisdiction are a cause of
supercession per se, even if the allegations are later shown to be untrue.
In such situations, the attorney general has original investigative power
23. Id. at 1377.
24. In Re: Guste, 454 So. 2d 806, 807 (La. 1981) (Originally published at 401 So.
2d 967 (La. 1981)).
25. State v. Perez, 464 So. 2d 737 (La. 1985).
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to inquire into allegations even before supercession is judicially sought. 26
Though the constitutional provision does not address the power to
investigate, it implies its existence. The attorney general must be able
to amass the factual showing necessary to establish cause to act and
must be able to investigate criminal matters to establish those facts.
The Bush supercession made express what was implied in Perez.
The Bush supercession petition alleged that the grounds for recusal of
a district attorney under Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article
680(1) constituted "cause" for supercession. These grounds are that a
district attorney "[h]as a personal interest in the cause or grand jury
proceeding which is in conflict with fair and impartial administration
of justice." If there exists a conflict between the prosecutor's personal
interest and that of the state in the fair and impartial enforcement of
its laws, this conflict simultaneously authorizes both recusal and su-
percession. Thus, a combination of constitutional values, statutory pro-
visions and ethical considerations come into play in the supercession
decision.
In the original Bush supercession, the attorney general alleged Bush's
personal interest arose as a matter of law from his potential culpability
for six criminal offenses, all of which he enjoyed prosecutorial juris-
diction over as the district attorney of East Baton Rouge Parish.27
As noted, the ethical grounds for recusal provided by the Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure article 680(1) do not exhaust the content
of "cause" for supercession. In Bush, however, cause for supercession
was expressly identified with a personal interest incompatible with the
fair and impartial administration of the law arising from the circum-
stances of that case. Supercession in a criminal proceeding conceptually
subsumes recusal because the constitutional value which both serve is
identical. Recusal would require removal of the district attorney from
26. Hargrave, supra note 9, at 837; Matter of Morris Thrift Pharmacy, 397 So. 2d
1301 (La. 1981).
27. These criminal offenses were specified in the contradictory motion filed by the
attorney general as follows:
(a) The misuse of at least $14,672.92 of public funds in violation of LSA-R.S.
14:67 (theft) and LSA-R.S. 14:68 (unauthorized use of a movable).
(b) Malfeasance (LSA-R.S. 14:134) for failure to properly budget funds as
mandated by LSA-R.S. 39:1304.
(c) Malfeasance by failure to keep a complete record of informant funds as
required by LSA-R.S. 42:282.
(d) Malfeasance in office by failure to comply with the public bid law, LSA-
R.S. 38:2212, for the purchase of office computers.
(e) Malfeasance in office, by instructing and permitting his investigator to prepare
falsified public bids for four office automobiles purchased without actual bids.
(f) Filing false public records, LSA-R.S. 14:133, or alternatively, injuring public
records, LSA-R.S. 14:132, with reference to the action stated in (e) above.
1991]
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the case in any event, and the supercession decision furnishes the officer
responsible for prosecuting the case.
Article IV, section 8 refers to "the assertion or protection of any
right or interest of the state" without qualifying the source of the right
or interest. It should follow that supercession can be justified whether
the right or interest arises from the constitution, statutes, or other sources
of law, federal or state. The invasion of a citizen's constitutional right
to privacy, or to equal protection of the laws, for example, by a district
attorney could therefore constitute cause for supercession. Recusal im-
plements a core constitutional guarantee of substantive due process of
law. Similarly, supercession recognizes that not only is an individual
entitled to due process, but the state itself has a right and interest in
the fairness and impartiality of its criminal justice system and in the
validity of convictions in its name.28 The congruity of supercession and
recusal in the facts of the Bush case results from this shared constitutional
value and purpose. It is also the principal constitutional value animating
the judicial ethics upon which article 680 is based. 29
The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized the nexus between the
constitutional guarantee and the recusal authorized by Louisiana Code
Criminal Procedure article 680 in Plaquemine Parish Commission Council
v. Perez 0 The district attorney there argued that recusal, a statutory
procedure, infringed upon his constitutionally granted prosecutorial power
and authority." The court held that article 680 implemented the sub-
stantive due process guarantee of article I of the Louisiana Constitution,
and that the exception clause of article V, section 26 subordinated the
constitutional sovereignty of the district attorney to the fundamental
guarantees of due process made by the constitution in article I, section
2, and section 22. The supreme court further ruled that the state has
28. La. Const. art. I, § 1 (Origin and Purpose of Government) provides, in pertinent
part: "All government, of right, originates with the people, is founded on their will alone,
and is instituted to protect the rights of the individual and for the good of the whole...
(emphasis added).
29. La. Const. art. I, § 2 provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, except by due process of law."
La. Const. art. I, § 22 provides: "All courts shall be open, and every person shall
have an adequate remedy by due process of law and justice, administered without denial,
partiality or unreasonable delay, for injury to him in his person, property, reputation or
other rights."
30. "We find, therefore, that C.Cr.P. 680's provision for recusation is not only
provided for but required by the constitutional guarantee of the fair and impartial
administration of justice." 379 So. 2d at 1378.
31. La. Const. art. V, § 26(B). "Except as otherwise provided by this constitution,
a district attorney, or his designated assistant, shall have charge of every criminal pros-
ecution by the state in his district, be the representative of the state before the grand
jury in his district, and be the legal advisor to the grand jury. He shall perform other
duties provided by law." (emphasis added).
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an independent right and interest in the presence of due process in the
exercise of prosecutorial power, and that this was the constitutional
purpose for recusal. The phrase "fair and impartial administration of
justice" connotes the state's interest in the provision of due process of
law by the criminal justice system: "We find, therefore, that Code of
Criminal Procedure [article] 680's provision for recusation is not only
provided for but required by the constitutional guarantee of the fair
and impartial administration of justice." '32
Thus, the ultimate "cause" for supercession in Bush was the pro-
tection of due process. The alleged use of the power of the state by
the prosecutor to suborn the enforcement of its laws, or at the expense
of fairness, or in service of any other personal interest, justifies su-
percession and recusal by reason of the injury to the constitutional
guarantee of due process in the criminal justice system of the state.
Due process as implemented in the norms of judicial ethics in Code
of Criminal Procedure article 680 requires that as a condition for the
use of the criminal judicial power of the state, the prosecutor exercise
that power for the public interest rather than in his self-interest, and
that he be divested of that power in any case in which he is incapable
or unwilling to do so. A constitutional harm is present. Recusal pro-
ceedings give a defendant an opportunity to redress, it, and supercession
proceedings give the attorney general a separate power to redress it.
PROCEDURE FOR SUPERCESSION
Perez and Bush employed different procedures for effecting su-
percession. The initial attempt to fashion a procedure akin to civil
proceedings in Perez was not expeditious, resulting in a long period of
uncertainty and possible taint of a district attorney. It was clear thereafter
that a supercession procedure, in addition to being legal and fair, must
be expeditious.
In Perez, the civil procedure analogue produced not only the delay
of extensive pretrial discovery but also that of a formal appeal guaranteed
by the Code of Civil Procedure. It was not until the entire course of
civil procedure was exhausted that the attorney general enjoyed final
judicial authorization to present evidence to a special grand jury and
to institute prosecution thereafter. The acts by Perez constituting the
cause for supercession occurred in February 1981. The final judgment
of the Louisiana Supreme Court in the Perez case was rendered four
years later in 1985. The case spanned two successive terms of office of
the incumbent attorney general who initiated the supercession.
32. 379 So. 2d at 1377. The Court cited Babineaux v. Judiciary Commission, 341
So. 2d 396, 400 (La. 1976) to state the essence of due process as "protection from
arbitrary and unreasonable action" by the government.
1991]
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The attorney general in Bush sought to use a speedier criminal
procedure analogue. Cause for supercession was conformed to the ethical
grounds for recusal provided in Code of Criminal Procedure article
680(1), and the related procedure for recusal by a simple contradictory
motion was then adopted as the procedure for the supercession. The
motion to supercede was tried on the merits six weeks after it was filed.
A district attorney recused pursuant to article 680 has no right of
appeal, although judicial review of the order of recusal may be obtained
through an application for supervisory writs.3 3 Both the court of appeal
and the supreme court declined to grant writs to review the case on
the merits in Bush.14 In contrast to the delay in Perez, the judgment
of the trial court became final five months after the initiation of the
supercession proceeding.
If Perez represents the judicial ratification of the substantive power
of supercession vested in the attorney general by the constitution, Bush
stands for a procedural innovation which more effectively actualizes that
substantive power. Procedure enhances substance, and an attorney gen-
eral who can supercede a district attorney by a simple contradictory
motion in practice has gained a more effective measure of supervisory
authority. Moreover, by the marriage of the constitutional act of su-
percession to the procedural vehicle well-established for recusal,1 the
uncertainty regarding the burden of proof in a supercession is eliminated
where article 680 is used as an enabling statute for supercession. As
noted, cause for supercession does encompass other grounds than article
680, and article IV, section 8 is self-operative. However, the clarity of
the procedure for recusal and the settled jurisprudence that grounds for
recusal were established by a preponderance of the evidence36 provided
support for the trial court's choice of that standard of proof for the
cause alleged in the Bush supercession.
In a broader sense, it would be appropriate to recognize that neither
the constitution nor the statutes specify a detailed procedure for su-
percession. All that is required is some type of procedure that provides
for court approval or rejection of the attorney general's request and
which comports with due process. The procedure need not be formally
33. La. Code Crim. P. art. 684.
34. Writ denied, No. KW-89-0271 (April 10, 1989) (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989); writ
denied, 541 So. 2d 903 (La. 1989).
35. The Court of Appeal, in denying Bush's argument that article IV, section 8 was
not self-operative and required enabling legislation, stated: "The attorney general is pro-
ceeding lawfully to show cause. Additional legislation is not necessary to facilitate these
proceedings."
36. State v. Edwards, 420 So. 2d 663 (La. 1982); State v. Vaccaro, 411 So. 2d 415
(La. 1982); State v. Marcal, 388 So. 2d 656 (La. 1980); State v. Snyder, 256 La. 601,
237 So. 2d 392 (1970).
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"civil" or "criminal" in the traditional sense of those terms. In terms
of basic due process, it would seem that the preponderance of the
evidence standard and the accelerated procedure of Bush meet those
standards.
ETHIcAL CONTEXT OF SUPERCESSION
The Constitution of 1974 did not reinvent the fundamental consti-
tutional values which constrain the exercise of quasi-judicial power by
a prosecutor and the ethics which safeguard those values. While the
balance between local and state power was altered, due process and
ethical considerations apply to whomever exercises the prosecutorial power.
Indeed, as suggested earlier, the Perez and Bush cases did not implicate
the basic tension between state and local governmental authority that
so permeated the constitutional convention debate on article IV, section
8. Rather, they involved the allegedly unethical behavior of two district
attorneys and the means available to ameliorate such conduct.
The prosecutor is a quasi-judicial officer.3 7 The near-absolute dis-
cretion of the prosecutor to charge or not to charge is an exercise of
quasi-judicial power by an officer of the court.3" In a broad 'sense,
ethics is the phenomenology of choice. Because prosecutorial discretion
in the exercise of judicial power is analogous to judicial choice, the
ethical norms which apply to each office are similar.
Both Perez and Bush presented a prosecutor's personal interest
arising out of his own potential criminal culpability. The ethical principle
underlying Code of Criminal Procedure article 680, as well as its lan-
guage, encompass any instance of bias for self, not just that arising
from criminal conduct. The ethical principle is that judicial power and
prosecutorial power is a trust and must be exercised fairly and impartially
for the public interest, not for the self-interest of the judicial officer.
For this reason Louisiana courts, under both the 1921 and 1974 Con-
stitutions, have applied to district attorneys as quasi-judicial officers the
ethical norms which constrain the choices and actions of judges.
37. State v. Marcal, 388 So. 2d 656 (La. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 977, 101 S.
Ct. 2300 (1981); State v. Snyder, 256 La. 601, 237 So. 2d 392 (1970); State v. Cox, 246
La. 748, 167 So. 2d 352 (1964); State v. Marcotte, 229 La. 539, 86 So. 2d 186 (1956);
State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910 (1940); State v. Tate, 185 La. 1006, 171 So.
108 (1936); Parkerson v. Norris, 529 So. 2d 1392 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 530
So. 2d 552 (1988); State v. Melerine, 236 La. 881, 109 So. 2d 454 (1959); Plaquemine
Parish Comm'n Council v. Perez, 379 So. 2d 1373 (La. 1980).
38. La. Const. art. V, § 26 (1974). "The district attorney-has entire charge and
control of every criminal prosecution instituted or pending in-his district and determines
whom, when and how he shall prosecute. [Citations omitted.] The district attorney is
given absolute discretion in the institution of criminal charges." State v. Perez, 464 So.
2d 737, 744 (La. 1985).
19911
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The parallel character of judicial and prosecutorial ethics has been
present at least since the amendment of section 1067 of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes of 1870.19 The present Code of Criminal Procedure
maintains this symmetry in article 671(l)(2)(3), providing for recusation
of judges, and article 680(l)(2)(3), providing for recusation of district
attorneys.
The ethical basis for supercession, even absent allegations of criminal
conduct, is of some importance because the second supercession pro-
ceeding brought against Bush ("Bush I") was not based upon criminal
acts but the violation of due process of law by prosecutorial acts which
were allegedly politically motivated and self-interested.
An examination of the other forms of "personal interest" the courts
have found to require recusal and the principles developed in the ju-
risprudence identifies other forms of "cause" for which supercession
may be authorized by means of the expedited recusal procedure validated
in the first Bush supercession.
The entire doctrine of the ethical responsibility of the prosecutor
was stated in one enduring decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court,
to which a legion of subsequent cases are but footnotes. In State v.
Tate, the Supreme Court wrote of the office of the district attorney:
In conducting a criminal case the prosecuting attorney must be
fair and impartial, and see that the defendant is not deprived
of any constitutional or statutory right, because he is a quasi-
judicial officer. (Citations omitted.)
This rule, founded on justice and fair dealing, we think is
intended not only to restrain the offer of illegal evidence or the
violation of the orderly rules of procedure by prosecuting of-
ficers, but also to require their recusation in those cases in which
their interest, directly or indirectly, may be such as to cause
them to sacrifice justice to personal advantage.
The district attorney is a quasi-judicial officer. He represents
the State, and the State demands no victims. It seeks justice
only, equal and impartial justice, and it is as much the duty
of the district attorney to see that no innocent man suffers as
it is to see that no guilty man escapes. (Citations omitted.)
Therefore he should not be involved in any extrinsic matters
which might, consciously or unconsciously, impair or destroy
his power to conduct the accused's trial fairly and impartially.4
(Emphasis added.)
39. 1877 La. Acts No. 35.
40. Tate, 185 La. at 1019, 171 So. at 112.
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The Louisiana Supreme Court has expressly held that not only do the
principles of State v. Tate enjoy continued validity, but that those ethical
norms are codified in Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article
680.
4 1
Tate supports the earlier analysis of this article that the state itself
has a due process interest in the protection of the innocent. With regard
to the supercession of a district attorney, once these ethical principles
organic to his office are incorporated into the concept of cause, cause
for supercession connotes a negligent, intentional or ethical failure or
inability by the district attorney to adequately assert or represent some
right or interest of the state, either to prosecute the guilty or protect
the innocent.
The attorney general's argument in Bush II that a political bias or
self-interest by the prosecutor which injures his fairness and impartiality
disqualifies the prosecutor was not res nova in Louisiana law. Several
court decisions have so ruled under the doctrine of the Tate case.
Therefore, if political bias or motivation leads a district attorney to
protect the guilty or prosecute the innocent, and such bad faith or
negligence may be proven, the existence of the bias causes an ethical
failure to assert or protect the rights and interests of the state. It is
cause for supercession as well as recusal.
The jurisprudence supports this construction of cause to include
political abuse of office and prosecutorial power. In State v. Marcotte,42
the district attorney was recused because of his political animosity toward
the defendant. Following the Tate doctrine, the Marcotte court held that
the prosecutor's personal political interest in a defendant's conviction
as well as an acquittal violated the due process standard of fairness and
impartiality. State v. Cox43 followed Marcotte. In Cox, the personal
animosity created by the defendant's criticism of the prosecutor's official
conduct was held to require recusal.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 680 is an ethics statute
because it attempts to regulate the professional choice of the prosecutor
which is the predicate of the exercise of power. Article 680's regulation
of the personal interest of the prosecutor seeks to exclude extra-legal,
subjective influence from the prosecutorial judgment, and thereby from
the resulting exercise or non-exercise of judicial power. Ethics is the
phenomenology of human choices, both professional and personal.
That the recusal statute is an ethics statute within this context was
demonstrated in State v. Snyder,44 the most often-cited case after Tate
41. 379 So. 2d at 1377.
42. 229 La. 539, 86 So. 2d 186 (1956).
43. 246 La. 748, 167 So. 2d 352 (1964).
44. 256 La. 601, 609, 237 So. 2d 392, 395 (1970).
1991]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
on prosecutorial ethics. In Snyder, the defendant was indicted for crim-
inal defamation based on statements made during the course of a political
campaign, during which the district attorney campaigned vigorously for
two opponents of the defendants. The district attorney admitted a strong
political animosity during the course of the campaign, but claimed it
dissolved afterwards. The supreme court accepted the prosecutor's good
faith, but ruled nonetheless.
... [W]hile we do not doubt that he is sincere in his belief
that he has vanquished the personal animosity he harbored to-
ward relator during the campaign, we do not believe that, under
the circumstances presented, it would serve the public interest
for him to remain in the case as a prosecutor. For, after all,
while he may believe that his personal animosity has subsided
or eroded, still, where such deep seated hatred has once evinced
itself, the district attorney might, even though unconsciously,
have impaired his power to conduct relator's trial fairly and
impartially. (Emphasis added.)
That even an unconscious personal interest could harm due process
is a radical application of article 680, and demonstrates that its burden
is the professionalization of prosecutorial judgments. The ethical ideal
of Tate and its codification, article 680, is that of the district attorney
as an excellent instrument of the'law, who actualizes the law objectively
in his professional choices and judgments, but without the influence of
personal or self interest in those judgments. Yet it is a metaphysical
truth that no human choice is free from some measure of subjective
value judgments. Tate, Snyder, and article 680 do not prohibit all
personal interests which may affect the judgment of the district attorney.
Only those personal interests which impact the core constitutional value
of due process by compromising the district attorney's ability to provide
the "fair and impartial administration of justice" are grounds for su-
percession or recusal. That value is the "public interest" which the
Snyder court believed might be infringed by a prosecutor who even
unconsciously prosecuted a defendant for private reasons of revenge or
anger.
Although it never proceeded beyond the initial stay order, the second
supercession proceeding in the Bush case ("Bush I1") was significant
in that it was based entirely upon this line of jurisprudence and the
ethical interpretation of article 680(1). It was the first and only occasion
in which the attorney general alleged that there was cause for supercession
under article IV, section 8 that was not based in fact or law upon
alleged criminal conduct by the district attorney. Bush II alleged as its
principal cause for supercession and recusal that the political self interest
of the prosecutor offended due process of law by an abusive exercise
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of the judicial power of the district attorney, by transforming the grand
jury into an instrument of retaliation. 4
Upon adequate proof of the malicious political motivation, the
attorney general's allegation of a non-criminal cause for supercession
based upon the Tate principles and article 680 would have entitled him
to a second judgment of supercession and recusal.
LIMITATIONS ON SUPERCESSION
One interpretation urged in Perez was that the power to supercede
by the attorney general would produce complete removal of the district
attorney from office. 46 Under that theory, the attorney general would
supercede the district attorney as prosecutor for the state in all present
and prospective criminal actions and proceedings, until all legal matters
connected to or arising out of the facts constituting the original cause
for supercession were finally concluded.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, while it legitimated generally the
substantive constitutional power of the attorney general to supercede for
cause,47 rejected the broad interpretation that supercession authorized
the attorney general to divest the district attorney of his office. The
court limited the scope of authority granted by a judgment of su-
percession to the power to prosecute only those criminal offenses arising
from and based upon the facts judicially recognized to constitute cause
for the supercession. In short, supercession is to a "case" or "cases"
rather than to the office. The Bush supercession motion conformed to
this interpretation, as did the judgment of supercession by the district
court.
45. In brief in support of the Bush II motion, Attorney General William J. Guste,
Jr. argued that "a consequence of the prosecutor's status as a quasi-judicial officer ...
is that he or she is subject to judicial ethics in the exercise of those powers." Guste
further argued that article 680's requirement that the district attorney be free from a
compelling political self-interest in any given case "is at the heart of the independence
and integrity of judgment required of his office by substantive due process. The exercise
of prosecutorial power . .. in service of a personal purpose or political self-interest, is
an inherently arbitrary and unreasonable action under color of law, and a violation per
se of the constitutional right to substantive due process ... "
46. [T]he Attorney General is compelled by the overriding state interest to
move this court to exercise its authority over District Attorney Leander
H. Perez, Jr. and his assistants by relieving them from handling any
criminal matters now pending before them until the disposition of these
matters and further, to ensure the integrity and impartiality of the criminal
justice system this court must authorize the Attorney General to supercede
the District Attorney in all pending criminal matters.
Supercession motion In Re: Guste, No. 62-463 on the docket of the Twenty-fifth Judicial
District Court in and for the Parish of Plaquemine.
47. 454 So. 2d 806 (1981).
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To what extent is the post-supercession grand jury investigation and
institution of prosecution limited by the cause for supercession? This
important issue was not resolved by Perez or Bush. The ambiguity of
the issue results from the supreme court's language in the Perez case
as to the authority granted to the attorney general by a judgment of
supercession:
... [to] institute and prosecute, or to intervene in any pro-
ceeding, as he may deem necessary for the assertion or protection
of the rights and interests of the state in the matters under
investigation by the additional grand jury or any other matters
arising therefrom.4
The jurisprudence is silent as to what measure of legal or factual
connexity a newly-discovered but related criminal offense, not within
the scope of the original cause for supercession, must have to the criminal
cases included in the judicial authorization as part of the cause, in order
for the attorney general to have the power to prosecute that offense as
well under the original judgment of supercession.
In Bush, the court of appeal correctly declared the limitations on
the prosecutorial authority of the attorney general after supercession.
However, it provided no standard for determining additional offenses
not clearly constituting cause but which were nonetheless judicially au-
thorized cases for investigation and prosecution because of the connection
to the cause. The court of appeal placed this limitation upon the special
grand jury in Bush:
[The grand jury] investigation is limited to the scope of Judge
Hester's ruling in which he found cause for the Attorney General
to supercede the District Attorney, i.e. the offenses for which
cause was found and all matters related there to and arising
out of its investigation. 49
The elasticity of "arising from" presents two choices for the attorney
general. Either he can charge and test his prosecutorial authority by a
judicial interpretation of "arising from," or he can file a second original
supercession proceeding to obtain express judicial authorization to pros-
ecute the newly-discovered offense.
The other consequence of the limited construct of supercession in
Perez is that the district attorney remains in office and continues to
exercise his constitutional power and authority in all other matters
pending in his jurisdiction. 0 A prosecutor in bad faith can exploit this
situation to tamper with justice. Such an extraordinary situation, a
48. 454 So. 2d at 807 (emphasis added).
49. In Re: Guste, No. KW-89-0748 (May 11, 1989) (La. App. 1st Cir.).
50. Id.
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criminal defendant lawfully possessing the power to prosecute his lawful
prosecutor, illustrates anew the tension between state and local power
in the constitutional polity.
The constitution in its framework for balancing primary local pros-
ecutorial power with limited and extraordinary state prosecutorial power
did not expressly contemplate the obstruction of justice or interference
with the constitutional process by the exploitation by the district attorney
of the retained powers of his office. The authorizing district court,
pursuant to article IV, section 8 and article V, section 16, should have
the judicial power to protect the integrity of the constitutional process
of supercession.
Concurrent to the filing of a supercession proceeding, the attorney
general, who acts on behalf of the State of Louisiana, should be entitled
to an ex parte stay order restraining the exercise of all prosecutorial
and investigative powers of the district attorney against all officers and
employees of the Department of Justice until final disposition of all
cases arising out of the supercession or until the supercession proceeding
itself is dismissed by final judgment. At any time that the district attorney
has grounds for such investigation or prosecution, he may simply recuse
himself and move the court to appoint a special district attorney ad
hoc to act for the state in those matters.
The authority of the courts to issue such orders to protect the
supercession process was judicially recognized in Bush I. The supreme
court initially issued such a stay order, as did the district court thereafter.
SUMMARY
The constitution only adumbrates supercession; the Perez and Bush
cases give that constitutional action definitive legal form. Perez provided
a substantive standard by its definition of "cause," and also established
the limited nature of supercession to authorize the superceding exercise
of prosecutorial power by the attorney general only in a certain specified
"'case" or "cases," but not the powers of the office of the district
attorney itself. Bush exemplified one effective procedure for supercession
grounded in the constitutional value of due process for state as well as
the individual. Bush further demonstrated that an ethical default by a
district attorney can constitute cause for supercession, even absent crim-
inal conduct, for a violation of the judicial ethics imposed upon pro-
secutors by Code of Criminal Procedure article 680(1) also violates due
process of law, in which the state has a right and an interest.
The Constitution of 1974 entrusts the primary prosecutorial power
to the district attorneys and gives them great autonomy in its exercise.
The supercession power at the state level is granted to the attorney
general to protect the ideal of legality in the criminal justice system.
By refining the means for the fair but swift exercise of this extraordinary
19911
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but essential power of the attorney general, Perez and Bush have helped
to frame the balance between local and state power in criminal pros-
ecution in a manner faithful to the constitutional intent.
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Appendix
19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE
STATE OF LOUISIANA
In Re; The Matter of Attorney Number: 12-88-103
General William Guste, Jr. Super- Section: II
seding the District Attorney of the Written Reasons for Judgment
19th Judicial District
GENTLEMEN:
The motion beforethis Court has been filed by the Attorney General
in accordance with Article 4 Subsection 8 of the 1974 Louisiana Con-
stitution. By this proceeding "to show cause," the Attorney General
seeks to have the East Baton Rouge Parish District Attorney recused
and to have the Attorney General supersede the District Attorney in an
investigation of and possible prosecution for crimes alleged to have been
committed by the District Attorney, and for all matters arising therefrom
or related thereto. Further, the Attorney General seeks authority to
request a grand jury pursuant to its request to supersede.
At the outset, this Court notes that it is confronted with a situation
that is virtually res nova, with few guidelines regarding the appropriate
procedure and attendant standard of proof to be employed. Therefore,
to facilitate appellate review of the issues addressed, this Court has
incorporated in this judgment procedural determinations and reasons
therefor.
The motion itself appears to be civil in nature, but the underlying
factual basis therefor alleges criminality on the part of the respondent.
By law, this Court has jurisdiction over both civil and criminal matters.
The Attorney General argued in brief that the "cause" issue is
something less than "proven cause", citing the discussion of the 1973
Constitutional Convention. However, due to the fact that the ultimate
resolution of this issue may result in a criminal prosecution and the
possibility of loss of liberty, due process seems to require more than a
bare, unilateral allegation of cause. In balancing the respondent's sub-
stantive and constitutional rights against those of the Attorney General
to make a showing of the legitimacy and good faith of its requests,
this Court determined that the appropriate burden of proof should be
by a preponderance of evidence. This Court is not being called upon
to make any ultimate findings of fact or to decide guilt or innocence,
and consequently, to require of the movant a standard of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt would be unduly onerous. In practice, such a mandate
would result in dual trials.
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For the same considerations above and below stated, this Court
allowed the admission of evidence that would, in a criminal trial, con-
stitute hearsay. The Court notes that this hearing was somewhat anal-
ogous to a preliminary hearing, and as such subject to the attendant
informalities.
The sole issue before this Court is whether or not the Attorney
General has shown sufficient legal "cause" to proceed in accordance
with Article 4 Subsection 8 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. A general
definition of the requisite cause employed by this Court can be found
in the Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Plaquemines Parish Com-
mission Council v. Perez, 379 So2d 1373 (1980): "This 'Cause' require-
ment refers to a showing that the District Attorney is not adequately
asserting some right or interest of the state."
It is the opinion of this Court that in its determination of cause,
the trial court is limited to deciding whether or not the Attorney General
possesses information sufficient to warrant official inquiry into the ac-
tions of the District Attorney. In other words, the question before the
Court is, "Is the Attorney General's request to supersede a legitimate
and good faith inquiry based upon the rights and interests of the state,
(and its citizenry)?" In resolving this issue, the Court is required to
make certain findings of fact and conclusions of law. These findings
are not substantive and are not intended to indicate a judicial finding
that the respondent is guilty of any actual wrongdoing. Such is not the
function of this Court and would indeed result in the usurpation of the
jury function, if a jury is ultimately necessary.
With this explanation of the procedures utilized at the hearing and
the Court's purpose in the outcome, this Court makes the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law, as required by the Louisiana
Supreme Court. In re the Matter of Attorney General Guste Superseding
the District Attorney of the 25th Judicial District.
The evidence preponderates in favor of the Attorney General's re-
quest and suggests a serious and legitimate inquiry into the misuse of
funds by the District Attorney in contravention of the laws of this State.
The evidence indicates that the District Attorney could not and did not
properly account for over $14,000.00 in public funds which was missing
from his office.
This evidence further preponderates in favor of the Attorney Ge-
neral's request and suggests a serious and legitimate inquiry into the
offense of malfeasance by the District Attorney for failing to keep a
complete and full record of the funds contained in the Narcotics Fund
and Special Investigation Fund, as required by R.S. 42:282. The testi-
mony of the DA investigator, Mike Thompson, specifically indicated
that there were no written records kept by the District Attorney's Office
with regard to the monetary status of the Narcotics Fund. The testimony
of Mr. Loller indicated that members of the District Attorney's staff
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confirmed that the same lack of written records applied to the Special
Investigation Fund.
The evidence preponderates against the Attorney General's request
and suggests a lack of cause to inquire into the offense of malfeasance
by the District Attorney in failing to comply with R.S. 38:2212. Although
the testimony was clear that no bid was filed in connection with the
purchase of a computer for the office, it was also clear that a declaration
of emergency was filed by the District Attorney, albeit late, in accordance
with the procedure set out to excuse no bids being requested. The
emergency declaration appeared to be filed in good faith and not as a
response to any outside inquiries or investigations of the District Attorney
or his office. The allegation of an intentional failure to perform an
affirmative duty in this matter appears to be insubstantial and not
supported by the evidence.
The evidence preponderates in favor of the Attorney General's re-
quest and suggests a serious and legitimate inquiry into the allegation
of malfeasance by the District Attorney in instructing his employee to
prepare falsified public bids on automobiles purchased by the District
Attorney's Office, and further into the allegation of filing false records
or injuring public records in violation of R.S. 14:132 and 14:133, re-
spectively. There is evidence in the record to indicate that the District
Attorney instructed an employee to obtain and/or prepare bids after
the purchase of the automobiles for the purpose of providing them to
media representatives who had requested those specific public documents.
Respondent argues that preparing false documents in response to that
request and presenting the same to the media does not transform the
documents into "public records" within the purview of R.S. 14:132 and
14:133. This Court pretermits this question as not within the ambit of
its inquiry into "cause". The undisputed testimony that the District
Attorney instructed an employee to fabricate what was purportedly a
public bid for the purpose of deceiving the media, and thus the public,
presents an incident that warrants further investigation.
This Court is not in a position to and is not being called upon to
determine actual guilt or innocence, and certain arguments for both
parties should be more appropriately raised at a later time. Some ar-
guments of justification and/or defense were made during these pro-
ceedings. These, often, were allowed by this Court for the sake of the
record and were not necessarily pertinent to this proceeding to show
cause. Some of the evidence introduced would be more properly con-
sidered in a later proceeding, rather than the hearing to show cause.
Absent further guidelines, this Court limited itself to assessing the le-
gitimacy of the proposed inquiry by the Attorney General by considering
whether or not the Attorney General has shown a necessity to be allowed
to investigate further, with the possibility of ultimate prosecution. Thus,
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this Court has attempted to gather information and to proceed logically,
equitably and with common sense.
Having considered the pertinent evidence, and finding that it is
sufficient to warrant further inquiry:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that:
1. the Attorney General is authorized to supersede and usurp
the East Baton Rouge Parish District Attorney and his office,
and to institute, prosecute, or intervene in any matters involving
the District Attorney's, or any of his employees', potential crim-
inal liability in connection with the subject matter of the hearing
before this Court, and any other matters arising therefrom. (The
exception to this general authority is the finding by this Court
of insufficient cause on the allegation of the District Attorney's
failure to let bids on the purchase of a computer.)
2. In accordance with article 680 of the Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure, the East Baton Rouge Parish District At-
torney is hereby recused from representing the State in all matters
under the authority, investigation or prosecution by the Attorney
General as herein above authorized by this Court.
3. In accordance with article 682 of the Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure, the Attorney General is hereby notified that
the East Baton Rouge Parish District Attorney is recused from
the proceedings hereinabove described, and that the Attorney
General, or his staff, is exclusively empowered with all of the
authority of the recused District Attorney with reference to the
matters hereinabove described.
4. The Attorney General is hereby authorized to request of the
appropriate judge of the 19th Judicial District to empanel a
grand jury for the purpose of investigating the alleged criminal
culpability of the East Baton Rouge District Attorney and/or
his staff, for the offenses for which cause was found and for
all matters related thereto or arising out of their investigation.
JUDGMENT READ, RENDERED AND SIGNED in Open
Court in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 27th day of January,
1989.
S/ Robert Hester
JUDGE, 19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
CRIMINAL DIVISION II
[Vol. 51
